The two telephone calls made in quick succession by senior US administration members to the Pakistani Prime Minister and the Chief of Army Staff have sent the pundits scurrying for reasons – both wit
hin the plausible and the implausible domains.
Vice President Pence calling the caretaker Prime Minister seemed more of a routine nature, complimenting him on his induction into the august office and wishing him luck in holding the July 25 elections in the country. He also conveyed good wishes from President Trump.
It is the US Secretary of State calling the Chief of Army Staff which has sent tongues wagging for clues. Understandably, three issues came under discussion including US relations with Pakistan, the process of reconciliation in Afghan
istan and the need for targeting all militant and terrorist groups in South-Asia without discrimination.
The fact that the US leadership opted to call the army chief instead
of the political leadership
of the country speaks
of the importance they attach to the Pak
istan military in helping the process of reconciliation move forward in Afghanistan.
The calls also came in the wake
of the truce announced by President Ghani after securing an edict from the Afghan Ulema Council urging the Taliban to cease violence against the Afghan people and the government. The truce is meant to facilitate the celebration of Eid-ul-Fitr without fear of violence.
The offer of ceasefire was also welcomed by the US government as “demonstration
of the Afghan government’s commitment to explore ways to end the conflict”. It also comes in the wake
of the US administration claim that it had succeeded in brokering direct talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government.
But, if all is going smoothly and there are indications of incremental progress towards peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan, and given the nature of current lack of trust between the US and Pakistani leaderships, why a call to the COAS at this critical juncture? Is it because the US wants Pakistani military to extend a helping hand in further softening up the Taliban on both these fronts: observing the ceasefire and getting to the
table to talk to the Afghan government?
If that be so, and given the depleting influence that Pak
istan now has over the Taliban, can it help the US in any significant way in this latest push for peace in Afghanistan? Or, is it that, now when the call has been made seeking its cooperation in this effort at a very high level, it could be targeted again and made to look vulnerable for any lack of progress achieved on both these fronts? Let’s also not forget that this push has come amidst an expanding and definitive divergence of strategic perceptions separating the two countries.
Pak
istan has repeatedly endorsed the need for peace in Afghan
istan saying that it was integral to the prospect of peace in Pakistan. It, therefore, is difficult to imagine why Pak
istan would not extend its support to taking the process further, thus facilitating peace within its own domain.
But, things are not that simple, or have not been that simple in the most recent past, wit
h the US and Pak
istan indulging in unprecedented incriminatory parlance. The US accuses Pak
istan of not doing enough to dismantle the Taliban and the Haqqani sanctuaries on its soil.
On its part, Pak
istan claims that it is fighting terrorists without any discrimination or sympathy. It also contends that it is engaged in an ongoing war, thus incurring a high number
of the dead and the wounded on its side, this being in addition to mammoth financial setback.
It also claims that Pak
istan Army is the only entity that has actually secured success in the war against terror. The improved security environment wit
hin the country, partly reflected in the disappearance of roadblocks, presents a living testament
of that claim.
Let’s get to why the calls at this time? I believe that the US is convinced that Pak
istan can still do a lot more in terms of influencing the Taliban to get to the negotiating
table – not in any quadrilateral or multilateral format, but in facilitating a direct engagement between the militants and the Afghan government, something that the US has been trying to do in the recent past, and which it claims is work in progress. Two questions arise here: one, can Pak
istan actually do this and, two, would it like to do this? These can be viewed in the larger context of developments in the last couple of months with regard to engagement between Afghan
istan and Pak
istan and the US and Pakistan. Owing to the serious efforts that China has been making of late, relations between Afghan
istan and Pak
istan have been on an upward swing.
The frequent exchange of visits of senior level dignitaries from the two countries has cultivated a level of confidence that, after all, issues between the two neighbours can be addressed through meaningful engagement. There are also reports of another visit
of the COAS to Afghan
istan in the near future. This is extremely encouraging and it must continue. The key role the military has played in reinvigorating the prospect of peace with Afghan
istan is not hidden, and it is likely to pick up further.
So, apparently, there is no reason why Pak
istan would not do its bit in facilitating a direct engagement between the Taliban and the Afghan government. The stumbling block could be the Taliban’s reluctance to do so. On the ascendant, it could believe that victory is just a few blocks away. So, why talk for a measly share in the government when it can grab the entire bounty?
Then there is also the factor relating to the entry of other players in the region, most notably Russia and Iran. At loggerheads wit
h the US, they are also engaged in creating a level of influence over the Taliban so as to impact their policies. This is not within Pakistan’s domain to alter. As a matter of fact, now that Pak
istan is under increasing pressure to move against the alleged sanctuaries on its soil, it is the Taliban who may be looking for alternate sources of support. Russia and Iran would come in handy. Let’s address the second question now: would Pak
istan like to do this? It is eager to secure peace within its geographical boundaries which it correctly links wit
h the advent of peace in Afghanistan. This makes for a pressing call that it would like to contribute to initiating peace talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government.
However, what could impede a more proactive involvement by Pak
istan is its nagging insecurity with regard to the role it believes India is playing in destabilising it throug
h the use
of the Afghan soil. This is inherent in the mindset that deals wit
h the overall perspective of peace in the region. Wit
h the US pressing it hard to go after the militant bands irrespective, Pak
istan feels constrained because of possible reprisals and the danger emanating from a commonality of perceptions between the Afghans and the Indians. On the face of it, Pak
istan could still play a productive role in the initiation of peace talks, as is also believed by the US. So the phone calls. It may also be willing to do so wit
h the proviso that its inherent concerns with regard to an Indian role are addressed. Can this be done? I believe it can be, but only as much as Pak
istan can be pressurised to undertake a self-damning initiative without addressing its security concerns. You can’t expect it to forfeit its last-surviving asset in Afghan
istan without assurances that its interests will be effectively safeguarded. It is for the US to go beyond the realm of polemics and do something far more concrete in this domain to expedite the advent of an elusive peace in the region.
Published in Daily Times, June 9th 2018.